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Creditor Seto:ffs in Bankruptcy Reorganizations: An Analysis 
of Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc. 
In an action between a debtor and a creditor, the debtor may 
seek to reduce his liability by pleading counterclaims. A permissive 
counterclaim-any claim against the creditor not arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the creditor's 
claim1-is typically termed a "setoff" to the extent that it does not 
I. "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party 
not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party's claim." FED. R. CIV, P. ll!(b). 
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involve affirmative relief. 2 If the debtor is insolvent3 and seeks bank-
ruptcy relief,4 setoffs may result in priorities whereby one creditor 
gains preference in the distribution of the debtor's estate over other 
creditors of the same class or even of a superior class.5 For example, 
if Jones and Smith are each owed 1000 dollars by the bankrupt 
Widget Corporation, which has assets of 1000 dollars, they normally 
would expect to receive 500 dollars each.6 However, if Jones also 
owes Widget 1000 dollars (Widget's sole asset is thus Jones's obli-
gation), and Jones sets off Widget's claim against him with his claim 
against Widget, then Smith will suffer a 1000 dollar loss and Jones 
will be whole.7 
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1538 (4th ed. 1951). See generally 3 J. MooRE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 13.01-.41 (2d ed. 1974). 
3. "A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act when-
ever the aggregate of his property • • • shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in 
amount to pay bis debts." Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970). One need 
not be insolvent to be entitled to the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act as a voluntary 
bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act § 4(a), 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1970). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, gives Congress the power "[t]o establish ••• uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." As James Mad-
ison argued: "The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately 
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where 
the parties or their property may be removed into different states, that the expediency 
of it seems not likely to be drawn into question." THE FEDERALisr No. 42, at 279 (P. Ford 
ed. 1898). See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 0.01-.10 (14th ed. J. Moore 1974) 
[hereinafter COLLIER]. 
5. In "straight" bankruptcy proceedings, Bankruptcy Act §§ 1-74, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-
112 (1970), only unsecured creditors are expressly affected by the Bankruptcy Act. 
Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(11), 63, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(11), 103 (1970). The Act sets out six 
classes of claims in a descending order of priority. Bankruptcy Act §§ 64, 65; 11 , 
U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 (1970). Creditors in each class must receive full payment on their 
claims before creditors in a lower class may share in the bankrupt's assets. See, e.g., 
In re Penticoff, 36 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Minn. 1941); In re Brannon, 53 F.2d 401, 402-03 
(N.D. Tex. 1931). All creditors in the same class share pro rata if there are insufficient 
funds in the bankrupt's estate to satisfy them all in full. In re Delaware Hosiery Mills, 
202 F.2d 951, 953 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Killoren, 119 F.2d 364, 366 (8th 
Cir. 1941); In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (3d Cir. 1941). In reor-
ganization proceedings, Bankruptcy Act §§ 77, 101-276, 301-99, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205, 501-
676, 701-99 (1970), the problem is more complicated; the judge generally establishes 
classes by reference to the legal character and effect of the creditor's claims. A class 
may be further subdivided for voting purposes. Bankruptcy Act§§ 115, 197, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 515, 597 (1970). See In re Sixty-Seven Wall St. Restaurant Corp., 23 F. Supp. 672 
(S.D.N.Y. 1938). 
6. The text assumes that Jones and Smith are members of the same creditor class 
and that no other creditors exist who are members of a superior or equal class. See 
generally 6A COLLIER, supra note 4, ,i 9.10. The priority afforded by the setoff right 
may even be superior to the priority of secured creditors in certain instances, however. 
For example, if the security interest is in accounts receivable, the unsecured creditor 
who is allowed a setoff will diminish the receivables, thus taking ahead of the secured 
creditor. 
7. It is often argued that such a setoff constitutes a voidable preference under 
section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). See 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 
,i 68.02, at 853 n.19. However, if at the time of the transaction the creditor does not 
have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent, section 60 will not apply. 
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Setoffs are expressly permitted by section 68 of the Bankruptcy 
Act in straight bankruptcy proceedings.8 However, there is no corre-
sponding section permitting setoffs under the reorganization pro-
visions-section 77, and chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII. Prior to 1974, 
the use of setoffs in bankruptcy reorganizations was governed by the 
Supreme Court's dictum in Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank 
& Trust Co.9 The Supreme Court, dealing with a case involving a 
section 77 railroad reorganization, stated that " ... § 68 of the statute 
does not control the disposition of the controversy ex proprio vigore. 
It governs, if at all, by indirection and analogy according to the 
circumstances."10 Lowden was generally understood as allowing bank-
ruptcy courts to permit setoffs in reorganizations if warranted by the 
equities of the situation.11 One court listed the crucial factors as the 
value of the assets involved, the temporary or permanent duration of 
the debtor's inability to pay its debts as they mature, the existence 
of superior liens, and the existence of an understanding between the 
debtor and creditor that amounts owed by the creditor to the debtor 
were to be used to cancel the debtor's obligation.12 In 1974, however, 
the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc.,18 which 
significantly limited bankruptcy courts' discretion to permit setoffs 
in section 77 railroad reorganization proceedings. This note will ex-
amine the Baker decision and consider its significance with respect to 
Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt &: Co,, 237 U.S. 447 (1915): In re Pottier &: 
Stymus Co., 262 F. 955 (2d Cir. 1919). Cf. Crisick v. Second Natl. Banlc, 115 F.2d 150 
(D.C. Cir. 1940). 
8, "In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bank-
, rupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against 
the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid." Bankruptcy Act § 68a, 
11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1970). 
Straight banlcruptcy proceedings contemplate a liquidation of the debtor's estate. 
In contrast, reorganization proceedings contemplate a continuation of the bankrupt 
enterprise pursuant to an extension or partial forgiveness of the bankrupt's debts, 
9. 298 U.S. 160 (1936). The case involved instructions requested by the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upon certified facts. 298 U.S. at 161. The first ques-
tion presented to the Supreme Court was "Does the right of set-off recognized by 
section 68(a) of the Bankruptcy Act apply to reorganization proceedings under sec-
tion 77 of that act?" 298 U.S. at 162. Asserting that the question was "too general 
and abstract, its relation to the controversy being indirect and problematical," the 
Court refused to resolve the issue. 298 U.S. at 163. Because the remaining questions 
were dependent on a resolution of the first, the Court dismissed the certificate, 298 
U.S. at 166. 
10. 298 U.S. at 164. 
11. See, e.g., Tyler v. Marine Midland Trust, 128 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1942): 
In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 790, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Susquehanna 
Chem. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1, 6 (W.D. Pa.), affd., 174 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1949); In re 
American Coils Co., 74 F. Supp. 723, 725 (D.N.J. 1947), revd. on other grounds, 187 
F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1951). 
12. In re Susquehanna Chem. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1, 6 (W.D. Pa.), affd., 174 F.2d 
783 (3d Cir. 1949). 
13. 417 U.S. 467 (1974). 
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setoffs under section 77. The focus will be on two issues: the doctrinal 
and policy justifications for the Baker rule and the impact of Baker 
on the summary exclusive jurisdiction of a reorganization court to 
enter an order barring setoffs in related proceedings. The note will 
then assess the extent to which Baker should govern the treatment of 
setoffs in Chapter X and XI reorganization proceedings.14 
In Baker, the reorganization trustees15 of the Penn Central Rail-
road instituted an ancillary suit16 against Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., to 
recover $6,999.76 in unpaid freight charges.17 Gold Seal counter-
claimed, asking $18,016.77 for loss and damage to its shipments in 
Penn Central's care. The district court granted the trustee's motion 
for summary judgment but allowed a setoff on the basis of the 
counterclaim, resulting in a net judgment of $11,017.01 for Gold 
Seal.18 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
judgment; the Supreme Court reversed on writ of certiorari. Justice 
Douglas, ·writing for the majority, noted that typically a court has 
jurisdiction to entertain counterclaims in its final resolution of a 
conflict, and that, in some instances, the counterclaims may be com-
pulsory.19 However, he found railroad reorganization proceedings to 
14. Chapter X is essentially concerned with the reorganization of large, publicly 
held corporations with complicated debt structures. See text at notes 84-86 infra. 
Chapter XI reorganization provisions may be utilized by any "person,'' including 
corporations, and are derived from the common law of composition. See text at notes 
93-99 infra. 
15. The court must appoint a trustee or trustees in a section 77 proceeding upon 
approval of the debtor's petition. Bankruptcy Act § 77(c)(l), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(l) 
(1970). Trustees must be appointed in chapter X reorganizations if the indebtedness 
of the debtor exceeds $250,000, and may be appointed if the indebtedness is under 
$250,000. Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970). Trustees are charged with the 
duty of preserving the assets of the debtor for the benefit of all parties in interest. 
Bankruptcy Act § 47, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1970). 
16. The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy 
• • • are hereby invested • • • with • • • jurisdiction • • • to-
(20) Exercise ancillary jurisdiction over persons or property within their respec-
tive territorial limits in aid of a receiver or trustee appointed in any bankruptcy 
proceedings pending in any other court of bankruptcy: Provided, however, that 
the jurisdiction of the ancillary court over a bankrupt's property which it takes 
into its custody shall not extend beyond preserving such property and, where 
necessary, conducting the business of the bankrupt, and reducing the property to 
money, paying therefrom such liens as the court shall find valid and the expenses 
of ancillary administration, and transmitting the property or its proceeds to the 
court of primary jurisdiction • • • • 
11 U.S.C. § ll(a) (1970). Ancillary suits are independent proceedings brought in courts 
other than the bankruptcy court in which the petition was filed. Ancillary proceedings 
generally are brought in aid of the bankruptcy court of primary jurisdiction when 
jurisdiction is not obtainable in that court. See l COLLIER, supra note 4, ,i 2.74. 
Questions pertaining to the general administration of the debtor's estate may not be 
entertained in an ancillary court. Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.S. 263 (1914). 
17. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 484 F.2d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1973), revd., 417 
U.S. 467 (1974). 
18. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 484 F.2d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1973), revd., 417 
U.S. 467 (1974). The district court opinion was not reported. 
19. 417 U.S. at 468-69. 
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be an exceptional class of cases, in which counterclaims that result 
in setoffs are inappropriate. The majority acknowledged that section 
68 expressly allows setoffs in straight bankruptcy proceedings,20 but 
it refused to incorporate by analogy the policy judgment embodied 
in that section into the section 77 railroad reorganization provisions. 
Two rationales were advanced to support the distinction. First, the 
Court stated that reorganization bankruptcies have a different ulti-
mate objective than straight bankruptcies, and that to permit setoffs 
would frustrate that objective: "The problem of the bankruptcy 
Reorganization Court is somewhat different than the problem of the 
straight bankruptcy court. Liquidation is not the objective. Rather, 
the aim is by financial restructuring to put back into operation a 
going concem."21 Since the collection of amounts owed the bankrupt 
is necessary to keep its cash inflow sufficient for operating purposes, 
and because to allow setoffs could significantly reduce that cash in-
flow, the court felt that setoffs violated the basic statutory purpose of 
reorganization proceedings.22 The Court buttressed its conclusion 
by noting that the preservation of an ongoing railroad was "in the 
public interest,"23 and implied that the allowance of setoffs could 
jeopardize that interest. 
Second, the majority sought to distinguish straight bankruptcies 
from railroad reorganization proceedings on the basis of the language 
of section 77(e): "[T]he Reorganization Court shall approve a plan 
if it 'is fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of 
each class of creditors and stockholders, and will conform to the 
requirements of the law of the land regarding the participation of 
the various classes of creditors and stockholders.' "24 Recognizing that 
setoffs are in effect priorities, allowing a member of a subordinate 
creditor class to collect on his debt ahead of a member of the same 
20. 417 U.S. at 468-69. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
21. 417 U.S. at 470. 
22. The Penn Central in fact faced a severe liquidity problem. See N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 21, 1974, at 37, col. 7 (late city ed.) (Penn Central faces cash shortage of $85.4 
million for operations by end of February 1975); id., Dec. 4, 1974, at 63, col. 1 (late 
city ed.) (Penn Central suffered $130.2 million operating loss in first 10 months of 
1974). Liquidity is essential to the continued operation of a debtor in reorganization. 
Without liquid capital the debtor could not meet its short-term obligations, such as 
wages, and would collapse without having had the opportunity to resolve its long-
range problems •. 
23. 417 U.S. at 471. The overriding public interest in railroad reorganizations is 
the maintenance of a viable national railroad system. In re Denver &: R.G.'\\T. R.R., 
38 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D. Cal. 1940). See generally Swaine, Present Status of Railroad 
Reorganizations and Legislation Affecting Them, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. 161 (1941). See also 
Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943); :Bankruptcy Act § 77(d), 11 U.S.C. 
§ 205(d) (1970), requiring the Interstate Commerce Commission to certify that a rail-
road reorganization plan "will be compatible with the public interest" before the 
plan may be implemented. 
24. 417 U.S. at 473, quoting :Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e)(l) {1970), 
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or a superior class,25 the Court found that setoffs were inconsistent 
with the "fair and equitable" standard enunciated in the statute: 
"The allowance or disallowance of setoff may seem but a minor part 
of the architectural problem. But to the extent that it is allowed, it 
grants a preference to the claim of one creditor over the others by 
the happenstance that it owes freight charges that the others do not. 
That is a form of discrimination to which the policy of § 77 is 
opposed. As a general rule of administration for § 77 Reorganization 
Courts, the setoff should not be allowed."26 In promulgating this 
"general rule," the Court departed from the position taken by most 
lower courts and commentators, who cited Lowden and maintained 
that bankruptcy courts could, in their assessment of the equities of 
individual cases, decide to apply section 68 setoff principles to 
reorganizations.21 
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Powell, 
sought to maintain the lower court interpretation of Lowden by 
resting the decision in Baker on an alternate theory.28 Significantly, 
the concurring Justices perceived the majority's holding as a shift in 
the law: "By announcing a doctrine barring judicial setoffs as a 
'general rule' the Court in the present case adopts a rationale incon-
sistent with Lowden, which quite clearly envisioned a case-by-case 
analysis of the propriety of each attempted setoff in the light of equi-
table considerations."29 
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, also argued that the majority view 
was a departure from Lowden:30 "Nothing could be more inconsis-
tent ·with Lowden than the flat order of the Reorganization Court, 
entered at the commencement of the reorganization proceedings, to 
the effect that no setoffs were to be allowed, unless it be that part 
of the Court's opinion in this case stating that '[a ]s a general rule of 
25. 417 U.S. at 473. See text at,notes 5-7 supra. 
26. 417 U.S. at 474. 
27. "Since § 68 does not create any new right but merely recognizes the doctrine 
of set-off as authorized by legal and equitable principles and provides a means for 
enforcement in bankruptcy, there would not seem to be any potent reason why § 68 
should not apply in Chapter X reorganizations. The decisions, under ••• Chapter X, 
as well as ••• Chapters XI and XII, have, without authoritative dissent, regarded 
§ 68 as fully applicable in the respective proceedings involved." 6A COLLIER, supra 
note 4, ,r 9.09, at 307-08. See also In re Cuyabogha Fin. Co., 136 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 
1943) (ch. X); In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 103 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1939) (ch. X); 
In re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1938) (ch. X); Lowden v. Iowa Des 
Moines Natl. Bank 8: Trust Co., IO F. Supp. 430 (D.C. Iowa 1935), afjd., 84 F.2d 856 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 584 (1936). 
28, Justice Stewart would have decided the case on jurisdictional grounds. See 
text at notes 69-71 infra. 
29. 417 U.S. at 476. 
30. Justice Rehnquist also relied heavily on section 77(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 
11 U.S.C. § 205(1) (1970). See note 50 infra and accompanying text. 
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administration for § 77 Reorganization Courts, the setoff should not 
be allowed.' "31 
The majority responded summarily that "Lowden v. North-
western National Bank &- Trust Co . .. is not to the contrary."82 
Nevertheless, it felt compelled to state that "[m]uch law has been 
fashioned in the reorganization field since 1936, the date of that 
decision. The contours of plans have emerged which have given new 
meaning and insight into the statutory words 'fair and equitable.' "38 
It is puzzling that the majority refused to take the final step of over-
ruling its dictum in Lowden. Perhaps the Court simply felt that, as 
dictum, Lowden could be overruled without so stating explicitly. 
However, this would be an unlikely way to deal with a dictum that 
has guided lower courts for thirty years.84 The Court's opinion more 
likely should be read as indicating that the core principle of the 
Lowden dictum-that there is no hard and fast rule as to the allow-
ance of setoffs-is not rejected. Rather, the Court sought only to 
limit the current scope of the Lowden dictum. By phrasing its result 
as a "general rule,''35 and suggesting that no "exceptional circum-
stances" could justify the setoff in Baker,86 the Court implied that 
setoffs would be allowed in section 77 reorganizations in certain 
situations. Instead of presuming that the policy of section 68 could 
be applied to railroad reorganizations, the Court, as a consequence 
of new insights into the meaning of the "fair and equitable" language 
in section 77(e), created a strong presumption against the allowance 
of setoffs. Thus, the opinion shifts the burden of justifying the setoff 
to the counterclaiming creditor. 
The operation of the Baker rule is to some extent unclear. On 
the one hand, certain tests previously employed to determine whether 
to allow setoffs under Lowden will no longer be dispositive. For 
example, the precedential value of a line of post-Lowden cases that 
allowed setoffs when an understanding was reached by the parties 
that the debtor's deposits with the creditor were to be used to cancel 
the debtor's obligations37 is now dubious. Under Baker such under-
standings may not provide the creditor who is a party to the under-
standing with a right to share in the debtor's assets that outweighs 
the rights of other similarly classified or superior creditors; such dis-
31. 417 U.S. at 482, quoting the majority opinion, 417 U.S. at 474 (emphasis orig• 
inal). 
32. 417 U.S. at 474 n.13. 
33. 417 U.S. at 474 n.13. 
34. 417 U.S. at 475-76 n.2 (Stewart, J., co~cuning). 
35. 417 U.S. at 474. 
36. 417 U.S. at 474 n.13. 
37. See, e.g., Tyler v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 128 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1942). See also 
Susquehanna Chem. Corp. v. Producers Bank&: Trust Co., 174 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 
1949): text at note 12 supra. 
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parate treatment would run afoul of the Court's interpretation of the 
"fair and equitable" language of section 77(e). On the other hand, 
although the exceptions to the Baker rule were not defined, situations 
of extreme inequity can be hypothesized that may justify allowance 
of setoffs. For example, the "unclean hands" of a creditor have been 
held to justify subordinating his claim to the claims of other creditors 
in the same class.38 Thus, if Jones and Smith are the only creditors 
of the Widget Railroad, which is being reorganized under section 77, 
and if Jones has caused the bankruptcy through fraudulent misdeal-
ings with Widget, the courts may still allow Smith to set off Widget's 
claim against him with his claim against Widget, thus subordinating 
Jones' claim. 
Even if the exact dimensions of the Baker holding are uncertain, 
it is clear that fewer setoffs will be allowed under Baker than were 
allowed under Lowden. Both of the rationales advanced to support 
this shift in judicial attitude are open to question. Justice Douglas' 
first argument was based on the protection of the debtor's cash in-
flow.80 Liberal allowance of setoffs would permit creditors to reduce 
their payments to the debtor by the amount of the outstanding debts 
owed them, perhaps slowing incoming cash payments to such an 
extent that the railroad would be unable to meet its expenses. But, 
although the Baker rule does protect cash inflow from setoffs, 
it goes too far, and unnecessarily rigidifies a reorganization court's 
ability to seek an equitable solution . to the problems of counter-
claiming creditors. There are several mt;ans of achieving the ultimate 
objective of a railroad reorganization-revitalization of an ongoing 
rail line-without completely eliminating the priority of setoffs. For 
example, the bankruptcy courts could postpone and preserve setoff 
priorities until the corporation has restabilized its position.40 The 
objectives of the act would be satisfied and the congressional policy 
behind section 68 of recognizing a priority for setoffs in straight 
bankruptcies would be respected in section 77 proceedings. Also, the 
amount of the setoff in some cases may be insignificant in relation 
to the debtor's cash flow. Disallowing setoffs in such cases obviously 
cannot be justified by the need to protect the debtor's liquidity. 
38. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305-06 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & 
Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). Taylor established the "Deep ·Rocle Doctrine." The 
Court subordinated the claims of Standard Gas to those of other creditors against its 
subsidiary, Deep Rocle Oil Co., on a showing that Standard had launched Deep Rocle 
as an undercapitalized entity and had thereafter mismanaged the company for its own 
benefit. 
39. See note 22 supra and accompanying t!!){t. 
40. This would be consistent with the view that a bankruptcy court's power to 
affect the rights of creditors is limited to such measures as are, given the circum-
stances, least prejudicial to those rights. In line with this view, reorganization plans 
that have not yet been confirmed by the reorganization court have been characterized 
as "little more than a provisional sequestration to give protection for the future." 
Lowden v. Northwestern Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 164 (1936). 
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Perhaps the rigidity of the Baker rule may be attributable to concern 
for administrative convenience,41 equity,42 or a fear that the lower 
courts will abuse their discretion.43 These considerations were not 
mentioned in the Baker opinion, however, and their significance is 
speculative at best. 
The second rationale advanced by Justice Douglas to justify the 
Baker rule-the "fair and equitable" requirement of section 77(e)44 
-is not independently determinative. As Justice Rehnquist pointed 
out in dissent, the allowance of a setoff in section 77 reorganizations 
is no more inequitable than the allowance of setoffs in straight bank-
ruptcy proceedings: "[I]t seems a sufficient answer to the Court's ob-
servation that the allowance of a setoff grants a preference .•. to say 
that the Bankruptcy Act's strictures against preferences apply with 
as much force to ordinary bankruptcies as to reorganizations, and 
yet § 68 of the Act specifically allows this type of 'preference' in an 
ordinary bankruptcy proceeding."45 Justice Rehnquist's position is 
sound, but it deserves a more thorough elucidation. 
Although the straight bankruptcy provisions contain no explicit 
requirement that treatment of creditors be "fair and equitable," the 
bankruptcy court operates as a court of equity, under express statu-
tory directives that for the most part give secured creditors priority 
over unsecured creditors46 and treat similarly situated unsecured 
creditors equally.47 The ~•fair and equitable" requirement in section 
77 has been defined in analogous terms: "There is a hierarchy of 
claims, the owner of the equity coming last. Wages owing workers 
running the trains have a high current priority. Secured creditors 
have by law a priority in the hierarchy. Unsecured creditors usually 
are pooled together. They may receive new securities, perhaps 
stock."48 Thus, the general policy considerations behind the "fair 
41. See text at note 53 infra. 
42. For example, equity may require that size of the creditor's claim not be con• 
sidered: "Ordinarily, a creditor is not entitled to better treatment merely because he 
holds a small claim rather than a large one." In re Hudson-Ross, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 
111 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
43. Cf. 6A COLLIER, supra note 4, ,r 9.09 (favoring a narrow· construction of Lowden 
to limit court discretion). 
44. See text at notes 24-27 supra. 
45. 417 U.S. at 482. 
46. Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(11), 63, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(11), 103 (1970). The secured cred-
itor who retains his security will not be allowed to participate in the distribution 
of the bankrupt debtor's estate unless the debt exceeds his security. The partially 
secured creditor will receive a credit to the extent that the security covers the debt, 
and dividends will be paid on the amount owed by the debtor that exceeds the 
credit. Bankruptcy Act §§ 57(b), (e), 11 U.S.C. §§ 93(b), (e) (1970). 
47. "[E]quality is equity, and this is the spirit of the bankrupt law." Cunningham 
v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924). 
48. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 473 (1974). 
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and equitable" language are, for the most part, reflected in the appli-
cation of the straight bankruptcy provisions. 
Section 68, which allows setoffs in straight bankruptcy proceed-
ings, is an explicit exception to these creditor treatment policies and 
is grounded in a congressional judgment about the equity of setoffs.49 
Accordingly, the policy that creditors receive "fair and equitable"-
treatment is not independently a valid reason for refusing to allow 
setoffs under section 77; Congress has decided that similar creditor 
treatment policies under the straight bankruptcy provisions do not 
exclude setoffs. As Justice Rehnquist noted,50 this argument is par~ 
ticularly persuasive in light of section 77('t): "In proceedings under 
this section and consistent with the provisions thereof, ... the duties 
of the debtor and the rights and liabilities of creditors • . . shall be 
the same as if a voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed 
and a decree of adjudication had been entered on the day when the 
debtor's petition was filed."51 In other words, the provisions govern-
ing straight bankruptcy apply with equal force to reorganization 
proceedings unless they are inconsistent with reorganization pro-
visions. A justification other than the general rule on creditor class 
treatment contained in the "fair and equitable" language of section 
77(e) thus must be found to distinguish creditor treatment in straight 
bankruptcies from creditor treatment in reorganization proceedings. 
A possible argument against Justice Rehnquist's position rests 
upon a technical construction of the "fair and equitable" language 
discussed above. Many have interpreted the "fair and equitable" 
language to lay down a rule of absolute priority: "As ... a term of 
art, it requires that as between secured and unsecured creditors,. and 
between unsecured creditors and stockholders, the priority of the 
senior interest over the junior in the distribution of equities in the 
corporate assets [be] absolute.''52 If the "fair and equitable" language 
is construed as an indication of a legislative intent to exclude excep-
tions to the general hierarchical treatment of creditor classes under 
section 77, then the section 68 policy with respect to setoffs should not 
be carried over to section 77 proceedings. 
The Baker rule does have several practical advantages. By dis-
allowing setoffs in most cases, Baker may bring about a simplification 
of railroad reorganization proceedings, and perhaps a consequent 
49. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt &: Co., 237 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1915). See 
also Studley v. Boylston Natl. Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913); Prudential Ins. Co. of 
America v. Nelson, 101 F.2d 441, 443 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 583 (1939). 
50. "The language of subsection (l) of § 77, even more emphatically than . the 
Lowden decision, would seem to unconditionally mandate the application of the rule 
regarding setoffs contained in § 68 of the Bankruptcy Act to railroad reorganizations 
such as this." 417 U.S. at 482. 
51. Bankruptcy Act § 77(l), 11 U.S.C. § 205(l) (1970). 
52. 9 CoLLIER, supra note 4, 11 9.18. 
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reduction in cost.53 Presumably the difficult equitable question 
whether to allow a setoff will arise less frequently because the credi .. 
tor seeking a setoff in the reorganization court will bear the heavy 
burden of demonstrating "exceptional circumstances." In a_ddition, 
the Baker rule is in accord with the common practice of reorganiza-
tion courts to grant on a motion by the trustee a general injunction 
restraining all creditors from seeking setoffs in ancillary suits. The 
order is typically issued at the time the reorganization petition is 
approved, and has become standard practice in reorganization pro-
ceedings.54 
The Baker rule, however, may defeat the expectations of business 
creditors who have extended credit on the basis of their counter-
balancing obligation to the debtor.55 The typical case is that of the 
:financing institution that extends unsecured credit in reliance on the 
fact that the debtor maintains sums on deposit with the institution. 
Under the Baker rule, the institution would be liable for the entire 
amount of the bankrupt debtor's accounts; it would not be able to 
set off those accounts against the sums owed to it by the debtor as a 
result of the extension of credit. Undoubtedly, such institutions will 
become more wary of extending unsecured credit in light of Baker. u0 
One should also consider the domino effect that the Baker rule 
may have on the stability of the national railroad system. Among a 
railroad's largest creditors will be the other railroads with which the 
debtor road has interlining agreements. 57 The more traffic two rail-
roads shuttle between themselves, the more likely it is that large 
overlapping debts and credits will accumulate. Prohibiting setoffs 
-53. The administration of a debtor's estate is a very expensive process, See, e.g., 
Note, The Cost of Corporate Reorganization Under the Chandler Act, 52 HARV, L. 
REv. 1349 (1939). 
54. REPORT OF nm CO!liMISSION ON nm BANKRUPICY LAws OF 11IE UNITED STATES 
§ 7-204, Note, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 238 (1973) [here• 
inafter REPORT], 
55. The banker's lien on deposits, the right of retention and set-off of mutual 
debts, are frequently spoken of as though they were synonymous, while in strict• 
ness, a set-off is a counterclaim which the defendant may interpose by way of 
cross-action against the plaintiff. But, broadly speaking, 1t represents the right 
which one party has against another to use his claim in full or partial satisfac• 
tion of what he owes to the other. That right is constantly exercised by business-
men in making book entries whereby one mutual debt is applied against another. 
Studley v. Boylston Natl. Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913). 
56. Denying banks a right of setoff "would in many cases make banks hesitate to 
honor checks given to tllird persons, would precipitate bankruptcy, and so interfere 
witli tlie course- of business as to produce evils of serious and far-reaching conse-
quence." Studley v. Boylston Natl. Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 529 (1913). 
57. "There is no statutory compulsion for interconnecting rail carriers to utilize 
any particular method of collecting fares and freight charges for a through-routed 
shipment. But, as a practical matter, only one such method is feasible. That is for 
a single carrier ••• to collect the entire fare, and then remit to the interline carriers 
their pro rata portions." In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 486 F.2d 519, 531 (3d Cir, 
1973) (Adanis, J., concurring}, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 990 (1974). 
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by a creditor railroad may put a serious financial strain on that rail-
road; in effect it must at least for some time bear the cost of inter-
lining the debtor's passengers and freight while paying for ·all of its 
own traffic interlined by the debtor. Such a. situation may cause the 
creditor also to seek reorganization or other bankruptcy relief. 
Multiple or chain reorganizations may be the result.58 , 
To some extent the dangers of the domino effect can be averted 
because a reorganization plan under section 77 must be approved by 
creditors of each voting class holding two thirds of the amount of 
total claims of the class. 59 Although the bankruptcy court can confirm 
a plan that has not been approved by each class if the plan is "fair 
and equitable,"60 creditor approval is significant in the plan's for-
mulation and in the judge's decision.61 If a plan threatens to force 
additional reorganizations, the creditors will balk at approving it. 
Furthermore, the Interstate Commerce Commission has a veto power 
over any railroad reorganization plan promulgated pursuant to _sec-
tion 77,62 and it would act to protect the national railroad system. 
Nevertheless, the Baker rule is unfortunate to the-extent that it forces 
a choice bettveen risking a domino effect and preventing the debtor 
line from reorganizing. 
The Baker decision also raises questions about the extent of a 
section 77 reorganization court's summary jurisdiction. Summary 
procedures permit informal, abbreviated decision-making processes. 
A plenary suit, on the other hand, is typically a regular civil action 
with summons, formal pleadings, full trial, and possibly a jury. The 
differences have been summarized as follows: 
The main characteristic differences between a summary proceeding 
and a plenary suit are: The former ·is based upori petition:, and 
proceeds without formal pleadings; the latter proceeds upon formal 
pleadings. In the former, the necessary parties are cited in by order 
to show cause; in the latter, formal summons brings in the parties 
other than the plaintiff. In the former, short time notice of hearing 
58. At least one court has attempted to solve this problem by finding a "trust 
relationship" between railroads; a reorganization railroad's debt to other railroads is 
viewed as property of the creditor, held in trust by the debtor, and thus not suscep-
tible to general pro rata distribution among creditors. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co., 486 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 990 (1974). Judge Adams, con-
curring in Penn Central, suggested that the treatment of interline freight and pas-
senger accounts should be considered sui generis; interline railroads should be given 
a preferred position in railroad reorganization proceedings with respect to owed 
freight and passenger revenues. 486 F.2d at 533. 
59. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970). 
60. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e} (1970). 
61. If the plan is not approve~ by creditors holding two thirds in amount of the 
total of the allowed claims of each class, the judge must make additional findings to 
ascertain whether the rejection was reasonable. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. 
§ 205(e) (1970). 
62. Bankruptcy Act § 77(d), 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1970). 
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is fixed by the court; in the latter, time for pleading and hearing is 
fixed by statute or by rule of court. In the former, the hearing is 
- quite ·generally upon affidavits; in the latter, examination of witnesses 
is the usual method. In the former, the hearing is sometimes ex parte; 
in the latter, a full hearing is had.63 
A section 77 reorganization court has the statutory jurisdiction sum-
marily to issue orders concerning the administration of the debtor's 
assets;64 thus, summary jurisdiction may be exercised with respect 
to such matters as the appointment of receivers and trustees and the 
priority of creditors' claims. A reorganization court also may exercise 
summary jurisdiction with respect to controversies that arise between 
claimants and the debtor's trustee or receiver regarding property 
claimed to be part of the debtor's estate, if the court has actual or 
constructive possession of the property.65 If, on the other hand, the 
controversy involves property in the actual or constructive possession 
· of a third person asserting a bona fide adverse claim, the bankruptcy 
court cannot summarily determine that person's claim upon a peti-
tion by the trustee unless the adverse claimant consents to the court's 
jurisdiction.66 Without consent, the trustee must bring a plenary suit 
in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. 67 
Baker was an appeal from a federal district court that had allowed 
a setoff in contravention of a summary order previously issued by the 
reorganization court.68 Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, 
argued that the summary jurisdiction of the reorganization court over 
the debtor's property made the order binding upon all other courts, 
and that no inquiry by the Supreme Court into the scope of the 
63. Central Republic Bank &: Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F,2d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir. 
1932). 
64. Bankruptcy Act § 77(c), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1970). See Lathrop v. Drake, 91 
U.S. 516 (1875). 
65. Bankruptcy Act § 77(a), 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1970) (reorganization court has 
"exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property"). 
66. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97, 99 (1944); Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U.S. 191, 
193 (1926); Duda v. Sterling Mfg. Co., 178 F,2d 428, 433 (8th Cir. 1949). See generally 
2 COLLIER, supra note 4, ,I 23.04-.07. 
67. See Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160, 164 (1938). 
68. The trustees of Penn Central brought a plenary action in the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois to recover freight charges owed Penn Central 
by Gold Seal. The Penn Central Railroad was concurrently undergoing reorganization 
proceedings in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The reor-
ganization court in Pennsylvania had issued an order which provided in part that 
[a]ll persons, firms and corporations, holding collateral heretofore pledged b}' 
the Debtor as security for its notes or obligations or holding for the account of 
the Debtor deposit balances or credits be and each of them hereby [is] restrained 
and enjoined from selling, converting or otherwise disposing of such collateral, 
deposit balances or other credits, or any part thereof, or from offsetting the same, 
or any part thereof, against any obligation of the Debtor, until further order of 
this Court. 
417 U.S. at 478 n.4. 
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reorganization court's discretion to allow or disallow setoffs was 
warranted: 
Section 77a gives the Reorganization Court "exclusive jurisdiction 
of the debtor and its property wherever located." ... It has been 
commonly accepted in the federal courts that "property'' within the 
meaning of this section includes intangibles such as choses in ac-
tion. . . . It follows, therefore, that the respondent's debt to the 
Penn Central fell ·within the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the Reor-
ganization Court immediately upon the approval of the petition for 
reorganization. While such jurisdiction may not empower the Reor-
ganization Court to enforce the cause of action, ... it certainly does 
empower the court to protect the "property'' and to immunize it from 
diminution through setoff or counterclaim. To hold otherwise would 
be inconsistent ·with the function of the Reorganization Court to 
consolidate and protect the assets of the petitioning corporation.69 
Because a reorganization court's summary power is exclusive, it must 
be respected by all other courts and can be attacked only on direct 
review.70 Justice Stewart would thus have reversed the lower court in 
Baker for not adhering to the general restraining order of the :reorga-
nization court against creditor offsets. His position finds support 
in recent federal case law dealing with the Penn Central reorgani-
zation. 71 
Justice Stewart's position assumes two subpropositions, both of 
which have precedential support and flow logically from the con-
gressional purposes underlying section 77's reorganization provisions. 
First, Justice Stewart assumes (and the majority agreed72) that a chose 
in action is property of the debtor, and thus subject to the jurisdiction 
of the reorganization court.73 Justice Rehnquist, however, asserts in 
his dissenting opinion that the claim that Gold Seal sought to set off 
was not "property that was actually or constructively in the possession 
of the trustees .... While the Reorganization Court undoubtedly had 
plenary authority over the trustees, and over the 'property' of the 
debtor, it certainly does not have such jurisdiction over whatever 
funds of respondent might be used to satisfy a judgment against him 
in favor of the trristees."74 Justice Rehnquist's argument misses the 
69. 417 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis original). 
70. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483 (1940); Stout v. Green, 
131 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1942). 
71. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 453 F.2d 520 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
408 U.S. 923 (1972). 
72. 417 U.S. at 472 n.7. 
73. 417 U.S. at 476-77 (Stewart, J., concurring), dting 2 COLLIER, supra note 4, 
,r 23.05[4], at 485. Debts owed a bankrupt commonly have been viewed as within the 
constructive possession of the bankruptcy court, enabling the court summarily to 
determine the rights of the various claimants. See, e.g., Lahey v. Trachman, 130 F.2d 
748, 750 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Worrall, 79 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1935). 
74. 417 U.S. at 480. 
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distinction between the enforcement of a chose in action-which re-
quires personal jurisdiction over the adverse party-and the preser-
vation of a chose in action pursuant to the reorganization court's duty 
to preserve the debtor's property. The reorganization court in Baker 
was not enforcing the chose in action (the debt owed by the creditor 
to the debtor); the trustee was enforcing the debt in a plenary suit in 
a different court. The reorganization court, apparently having deter-
mined that setoffs against the debt were inappropriate in the case 
before it, 75 was merely protecting the chose in action wherever it was 
enforced. Such protection is justifiable because a chose in action, 
which may reflect an account receivable, for example, is a common 
corporate asset that may be bought and sold in the same way as a 
physical asset. It represents potential cash inflow, and an attempt to 
revitalize a corporation by reorganization requires protection of the 
corporation's cash flow as well as protection of its tangible assets.70 
Second, Justice Stewart assumes that the reorganization trustee 
can institute a plenary suit against a creditor in a district court 
and at the same time bring with him a reorganization court decree 
that limits the district court's jurisdiction to allow creditor setoffs. 
By so doing, the trustee seeks relief in the district court without 
submitting himself to the full jurisdiction of that court, which 
would include jurisdiction to allow counterclaims and setoffs. 
'While this proposition runs contrary to the thrust of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 13(b), which explicitly allows the pleading of 
permissive counterclaims, it has been recognized that bankruptcy 
reorganizations are unlike other civil actions.77 The goal of cor-
porate revitalization is facilitated when the trustee is able to pur-
sue his claims unhindered by the risk of potential asset depletions 
75. See text at notes 80-83 infra. 
76. See text at note 22 supra. 
77. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 470 (1974). See also Common-
wealth v. Bartlett, 384 F.2d 819, 821 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968), 
quoting Continental Ill. Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island Ry., 294 
U.S. 648, 676 (1935): 
The interest of the court in any reorganization is greater than • • • the pre• 
vention of diminution of assets and the achievement of an equitable adjustment 
among claimants. It has the further object of preserving the corporation as 
a going concern. '[I']o prevent the attainment of that object is to defeat the very 
end the accomplishment of which was the sole aim of the section, and thereby 
to render its provisions futile.' 
Cf. In re Penn Victor Dairies, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 126, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1935): 
The inference is drawn that the court is without the judicial power to restrain 
the landlord from resuming the possession of its property. The general principle 
may be conceded. We have, however, another principle which is applicable, This 
is that, the property and affairs of the debtor having been committed to the care 
of the court, it cannot permit any interference with the performance of its duty. 
Under section 77B [the predecessor of chapter X], a part of that duty is to 
supervise and pass upon a plan of reorganization of the debtor so as to enable 
it to continue its business under its own management. All rights to the assertion 
of remedies against the debtor are necessarily suspended until one of the final 
objectives of the section 77B proceeding has been reached. 
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through setoffs that the reorganization court has already deter-
mined to be unwarranted. For example, when the creditor has pos-
session of property claimed by the trustee as a part of the debtor's 
estate, the problem of obtaining personal jurisdiction may require 
that the trustee pursue his claim in an ancillary court of appropriate 
jurisdiction.78 The debtor's estate may be reduced without justifica-
tion if the ancillary court has the jurisdiction to set the trustee's right 
to the property off against the claim of the creditor against the 
debtor's estate, in violation of an order of a reorganization court.79 
The majority opinion in Baker ignored the jurisdictional prob-
lem and considered the extent of a railroad reorganization court's 
discretion to allow setoffs, announcing its general rule against allow-
ance of setoffs. In one sense, the result is baffling. The Court, review-
ing a district court decision that allowed a setoff in contravention of 
a reorganization court decree, reversed the district court on the 
ground that reorganization courts generally do not have the power 
to allow setoffs, even though the reorganization court in Baker ac-
tually enjoined all setoffs. The result would make sense if the major-
ity assumed without comment that the reorganization court actually 
had not enjoined all setoffs, a matter Justice Stewart considered "not 
wholly free from doubt."80 However, the introductory language of 
the majority opinion seemed to acknowledge the reorganization 
court's prohibition of setoffs, 81 and the prohibition was recognized 
as such by both the concurring82 and dissenting opinions.83 Strictly 
speaking, then, the Court's treatment of the merits of the district 
court's allowance of the setoff may imply that the district court had 
some discretion not to heed the reorganization court's order. Such 
a retreat from the exclusivity of a reorganization court's summary 
jurisdiction would be surprising. The more logical explanation is 
that Justice Douglas chose not to deal with the jurisdictional point 
but rather to lay down a general rule for all courts about the pro-
priety of setoffs in bankruptcy reorganizations. His failure to rest on 
or even to mention the district court's violation of the reorganization 
court's order was perhaps a technical flaw in the opinion, because it 
78. See text at notes 66-67 supra. This assumes' that the property is not merely 
a chose in action, such as a debt, which would be in the possession of the debtor 
and thus within the jurisdiction of the reorganization court. Note, however, that the 
reorganization court could still issue an order prohibiting a setoff against the cred-
itor's claim, because technically the order would prohibit the setting off of the debtor's 
right to the property-a chose of action within the court's jurisdiction-rather than 
a setting off of the property itself. 
79. See note 78 supra. 
80. 417 U.S. at 477 (concurring opinion). 
81. 417 U.S. at 468. 
82. 417 U.S. at 477. 
83. 417 U.S. at 482. 
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could give rise to unwarranted implications, but it should not be 
read as a harbinger of a major doctrinal shift. 
The balance of this note discusses Baker's applicability to reorga-
nizations other than section 77 railroad reorganizations. By analogy, 
Baker may be extended at least to reorganizations under chapter X 
of the Bankruptcy Act.84 Chapter Xis a reorganization scheme gen-
erally designed for use by large corporate debtors with complex 
financial problems.85 It is an accommodation of the public's interest 
in protecting stockholders and promoting the health of economically 
significa.I!t enterprises and the private interests of the corporation's 
creditors and management. 86 
Chapter X, like section 77, requires that a reorganization court 
find a proposed plan to be "fair and equitable" before it may be 
confirmed.87 It is accepted doctrine that the meaning of the term 
"fair and equitable" is the same in chapter X as in section 77.88 
Thus, to the extent that the Court's decision in Baker rests on a 
construction of the "fair and equitable" language of section 77, its 
reasoning applies with equal force to reorganizations under chapter X. 
The argument in Baker concerning the public's interest in re-
vitalizing :financially insecure railroads89 and the consequent neces-
sity to preserve cash inflow by limiting setoffs00 also extends to chapter 
X. Chapter X reflects the strong national economic interest in the 
revitalization of large corporate debtors.91 Large corporations employ 
many workers and are major suppliers and customers. In addition, 
they support the general advance of technology. While the public 
interest in revitalization of large corporations in general is perhaps 
less specific than the public interest in revitalization of railroads, it 
is still quite important.92 If the threat to the debtor's liquidity posed 
84. 11 u.s.c. §§ 501-676 (1970). 
85. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals, 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores Corp, 
v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. United States Realty &: Improvement Co., 310 
U.S. 434 (1940). 
86. See S. REP. No, 2073, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-9 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 3012, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); Doub, Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter X of the 
National Bankruptcy Act, 3 MD. L. REv. 1 (1938); Wham, Some Recent Developments 
in Corporation Reorganizations, 18 N.Y.U. L. REv. 352 (1941). 
87. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970). 
88. Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 85 
(1942); Consolidated Rocle Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). Chapter X was 
originally introduced in Congress at the same time as section 77, and denominated 
section 77B. See w. MOORE, THE REORGANIZATION OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS 18-19 
(1941). 
89. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
90. See text following note 39 supra. 
91. S. REP. No. 2073, supra note 86, at 7; Wham, supra note 86, at 352-53, Sec 
also Hearings on H.R. 6439 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, '75th Cong., 
1st Sess. 163-64 (1937) [hereinafter House Hearings]. 
92. But see In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 453 F.2d 520, 522 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972). 
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by the use of the setoff device cannot be tolerated (absent excep-
tional circumstances) in light of the purpose of section 77, then 
setoffs also cannot be tolerated under chapter X in light of the im-
portance of liquidity to the revitalization of the corporate debtor. 
Whether Baker should apply to chapter XI· reorganizations is a 
more complicated question. Chapter XI is rooted in the common la'\v 
of composition and arrangement.93 It was enacted concurrently with 
chapter X,94 and the two chapters were designed to be mutually 
exclusive altematives.95 Chapter Xis the appropriate reorganization 
vehicle when the debtor is large, when there is a complex capital 
structure that needs adjustment, and when creditors are widespread 
and as a practical matter unable to participate effectively.96 The 
typical chapter XI debtor is likely to be smaller, or to have less com-
plex financial problems.97 Moreover, the relief granted under chapter 
XI is more limited than that granted under chapter X,98 perhaps 
taking the form of a simple extension or composition without extin-
guishment of any debts.99 The rights of secured creditors theoretically 
93. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 605 (1965). See also, Bank-
ruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970) (defining an arrangement as "any plan 
of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or e.xtension of the time of payment of 
bis unsecured debts • • •• ''). 
94. Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 905. 
95. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 607 (1965). 
96. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores Corp. 
v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. United States Realty &: Improvement Co., 310 
U.S. 434 (1940). 
97. Chapter XI is a statutory variation of the common-law composition of cred-
itors and, unlike the broader scope of Chapter X, is limited to an adjustment 
of unsecured debts. It was sponsored by the National Association of Credit Men 
and other groups of creditors' representatives whose experience had been in rep-
resenting trade creditors in small and middle-sized commercial failures. . • . The 
contrast between the provisions of Chapter X, carefully designed to protect the 
creditor and stockholder interests involved, and the summary provisions of Chap-
ter XI is quite marked •.•• [T]he basic purpose of Chapter XI [is] to provide 
a quick and economical means of facilitating simple compositions among general 
creditors who have been deemed by Congress to need only the minimal disinter-
ested protection provided by that Chapter. 
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 605-06 (1965). 
98. In comparing chapter XI to chapter X, the Supreme Court noted: 
The debtor generally remains in possession and operates the business under court 
supervision, § 342. A trustee is only provided in the very limited situation where 
a trustee in bankruptcy has previously been appoillted, § 332. There is no re-
quirement for a receiver, but the Court "may" appoint one if it finds it to be 
"necessary," § 332. The plan of arrangement is proposed by, and only by, the 
debtor, §§ 306(1), 323, 357, and creditors have only the choice of accepting or 
rejecting it. Acceptances may be solicited by the debtor even before filing of the 
Chapter XI petition and, in fact, must be solicited before court review of the 
plan, § 336(4). There are no provisions for an independent study by the court 
or a trustee, or for advice by them being given to creditors in advance of the 
acceptance of the arrangement. In short, Chapter XI provides a summary proce-
dure whereby judicial confirmation is obtained on a plan that has been formu-
l~t~d and accepted with only a bare minimum of independent control or super-
V1S1on. 
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 606 (1965). 
99. Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970). 
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are unaffected by a chapter XI plan,100 although in practice such 
creditors often are enjoined "from executing upon their security 
interests.101 
To the extent that Baker rested on an absolute priority doctrine 
derived from the "fair and equitable" language of section 77,102 the 
· case should not apply to reorganizations under chapter XI. There is 
no requirement in chapter XI that a plan be "fair and equitable,"103 
and Congress has required that creditors in a chapter XI arrangement 
be given only minimal protection.104 
The public interest rationale of the Baker decision also cannot be 
carried over to chapter XI. Chapter XI is the product of lobbying 
by trade creditors' associations that sought an alternative to the cum-
bersome provisions of chapter X.105 The interests it protects are those 
of trade creditors; the court need not find the reorganization plan 
to be in the public interest, but only that it is "for the best interests 
of the creditors."106 This requirement is typically interpreted to mean 
only that the plan would pay creditors more than they would receive 
werethe debtor to liquidate in a straight bankruptcy proceeding.107 
Thus, to the degree that Baker rests on the public interest in the 
revitalization of railroads, it should not be applied by analogy to 
chapter XI arrangements. The interests protected by chapter XI are 
overwhelmingly private. 
The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws has proposed a new chapter 
VII, which consolidates present chapters X and XI into one reorgani-
100. Bankruptcy Act §§ 306(1), 307(1); 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), 707(1) (1970). 
101. Secured creditors may be temporarily restrain~d from realizing on their col-
lateral if such realization would defeat the chapter's rehabilitative purposes. In re 
Land Foods, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
102. See text at note 52 supra. 
103. "Fair and equitable" language originally was included in chapter XI, but it 
was deleted in 1952 and replaced with the requirement that the plan be "for the 
best interests of the creditors." Congress deemed this latter requirement to be suffi-
cient protection in light of the general philosophy of Chapter XI to expedite "sim-
ple" compositions. See S. REP. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20-21 (1952); H.R. 
REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1952). The "fair and equitable" language 
would have created difficulties when applied to a typical chapter XI situation in-
volving an individual proprietorship, a partnership, or a closely held corporation in 
which the owners are also the managers: "[I']he fair and equitable rule ••• cannot 
realistically be applied in a Chapter XI, XII, or XIII proceeding. Were it so applied, 
no individual debtor and, under Chapter XI, no corporate debtor where the stock 
ownership is substantially identical with management could effectuate an arrange• 
ment except by payment of the claims of all creditors in full." H.R. REP. No. 2320, 
supra, at 21. 
104. See notes 97-98 supra. 
105. See House Hearings, supra note 91, at 31, 35; note 9'7 supra. 
106: Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1970). 
107. See In re Village Men's Shops, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Ind. 1960); In re 
Bruce Hunt of Albany Corp., 163 F. Supp. 939 (N.D.N.Y. 1958); 50 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s,) 
465 (Ref. S.D. Ind. 1941). . 
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zation scheme.108 While the proposed Act specifically recognizes the 
right of setoff in reorganization cases,109 it qualifies that right by pro-
viding that a petition filed "by or against a debtor eligible for relief 
under [the reorganization] chapter shall operate as a stay of the setoff 
of any obligation to the debtor against any claim owing by the 
debtor .... "110 Thus, the new Act codifies the trustee's typical prac-
tice in section 77 and chapter X reorganizations of obtaining an 
injunction against setoffs at the time of the filing of the petition.m 
However, if a hearing is brought by creditors, the burden of showing 
that the stay of setoffs is an appropriate exercise of the court's power 
is on the trustee or the debtor in possession.112 This burden can be 
met only by demonstrating that the person asserting the right of 
setoff is adequately protected.113 
Interestingly, the proposed chapter contains the "fair and equi-
table" language currently found in section 77 and chapter X.114 Since 
the new Act also expressly allows setoffs, it is apparently inconsistent 
with the majority holding in Baker, which found the "fair and ~qui-
table" language of section 77 to bar setoffs except in "exceptional 
circumstances."115 Unless the "fair and equitable" language of the 
new Act can be distinguished from the same language in section ;'1;7, 
the Baker Court's interpretation of that language will be open to 
question if the Act is passed.116 It is possible, however, that the Baker 
rule will survive. The argument that setoffs can seriously impair cash 
flow and thus hinder the revitalization of an organization whose exis-
tence is crucial to the public welfare would retain its · significance 
under the proposed Act. Furthermore, Justice Douglas asserted in a 
footnote in Baker that "[i]n a straight bankruptcy case, ... the Court 
construed § 68 as 'permissive rather than mandatory' and as to which 
the bankruptcy court 'exercises its discretion ... upon the general 
108. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) • [hereinafter Proposed Bankruptcy Act]. 
109. "The allowable claim , of a creditor shall be set off against a mutual debt 
owed to the debtor by the creditor except to the extent that (I) the allowable claim 
was transferred to one asserting the right of setoff after the date of the petition, or 
(2) the allowable claim was transferred to one asserting the right of setoff within 
three months before the date of the petition at a time when the debtor was insolvent. 
For the purposes of this subdivision, the debtor js presumed to have been insolvent 
during the three months prior to the date of the petition." Proposed Bankruptcy 
Act § 5-20l(a). 
110. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-204(a). 
111. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-204, Comment 1. 
112. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-204(b). 
113. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-204(b). 
114. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-310(d)(2)(B). 
115. See text at notes 35-36 supra. 
116. The new act would relax the requirement of the "fair and equitable" standard 
as presently applied by the courts, however. REPORT, supra note 54, § 7-310, Note, at 
254. ' . 
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principles of equity.'"117 The footnote implies that, even when set-
offs are explicitly allowed by statute, they may be denied if the equi-
ties of the particular situation so warrant. Under this interpretation,
Baker could continue to stand for the proposition that setoffs should
be allowed only in "exceptional circumstances."" 31s
117. 417 U.S. at 470 n., citing Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt & Co., 237
US. 447 (1915).
118. It could be argued that, since the new Act states that "[t]he allowable claim
of a creditor shall be setoff against a mutual debt ... " (emphasis added), see note 109
supra, courts would have no remaining equitable discretion to deny setoffs. However,
the language of section 68a of the current Act, 11 U.S.C. § 108(a), also states that "one
debt shall be setoff against the other . . ." (emphasis added), and the Supreme Court
has held this language is "permissive rather than mandatory." See text at note 64 supra.
The effect of Baker may also be felt with respect to section 7-204 of the Proposed
Act, which provides that the debtor's petition acts as a stay of all setoffs, provided
that the trustee proves "that the person asserting the right of setoff is adequately
protected." Baker indicates that setoffs are disfavored in the reorganization context,
and the case may prompt courts to give a liberal reading to the term "adequately
protected" so that stays of setoffs may be routinely granted.
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